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Ultimate Concern and Finitude: Schelling’s Philosophy of Religion 
and Paul Tillich’s Systematic Theology 
Michael Vater, Marquette University 
 
 
 
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the publication of the complete Systematic Theology, a 
massive attempt to present in a rational fashion the core of Christian beliefs, myths, and rites in a 
manner that speaks to its time—a time of profound unbelief and anxiety.   As theologian,  
Tillich feels no lack of warrant, for theology speaks only of things that are of ultimate concern to 
humans, things that unavoidably interest us because they are a matter of our very being or 
nonbeing (ST I, 14, 16).   Our experience of being in modern times is one of anxiety, a perceived 
background  of meaninglessness that drives us into collectivism or conformism, or individualism, 
or despair and deprives us of authentic forms of courage—or the ability to confront our finitude, 
the wormhole of nonbeing in the ontological apple.  “Anxiety is finitude, experienced as one’s 
own finitude” (CB 35).  What is Christian in Tillich’s theology is its tie to historical Christianity 
and to the normative expression of early Christians that in Jesus God manifested the Logos or 
messiah. But that is not our concern here, except to remark on Tillich’s intellectual honesty: he is 
an exquisite practitioner of the history of ideas, at once able to encompass whole eras in 
generalizations that are apt and to epitomize individual thinkers with remarkable brevity.  Our 
concern in this paper is to elucidate how Tillich makes religion a matter of ontology, and how, 
from the very first, he follows Schelling’s model of ontological questioning—which I will here 
call the double-helix, or the twisted structure of being and nonbeing such that reality is unable to 
be in any other way than dynamic. 
 
In the first section of this paper I shall briefly discuss Tillich early Schelling studies and then 
turn to Schelling’s own texts to show that Tillich interpretation is correct.  The major part of the 
paper will be devoted to showing how Schelling’s concepts form the structural backbone of 
Systematic Theology as  well as the more accessible Courage to Be lectures where Tillich argues 
that the only form of credible religious belief is an absolute one where Christianity criticizes its 
concrete symbols and embraces a God beyond  theism (CB 188-89).  While the language of the 
lectures is more daring, its content is no more disquieting to the professional theologian than the 
picture presented in the final volume of Systematic Theology of the ambiguous presence of the 
Spirit in a spiritual community that across history may or may not dwell in those ecclesial 
structures that call themselves Christ’s church.   The ‘unambiguous life’ that is sheltered by 
spiritual community is fragmentary and anticipatory at best, but without specific religious 
teachings, symbols or acts (ST 3, 157-58). Tillich’s religion, like Schelling’s, is ontological, not 
ecclesial. 
 
I. 
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Tillich’s knowledge of Schelling is deep and sympathetic from the very first.  In his 
philosophical dissertation of 1910, The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling’s 
Positive Philosophy, the young Tillich attempts a sweeping interpretation of Schelling’s long 
journey to the philosophical religion of the late writings, but gravitates toward the philosophy of 
freedom of the 1809 Philosophical Investigations.  The essence of human consciousness is God-
positing, or intellectual intuition of the identity between finite and absolute consciousness (CHR 
122), but at the same time it is estranged from its God-positing substantiality. Tillich agrees with 
Schelling that essence of the religious picture is that “the formulation of a concept of religion 
must necessarily include a relationship between God and man that presupposes a definite 
division between them” (ibid., 124).  The tension between identity and action in the human spirit 
that is the driving motive in Schelling’s early philosophical development becomes in the 1809 
essay a historical process, a path of development in which the rest of intellectual intuition is 
sundered when the subject becomes agent.  Finite consciousness posits itself as fallen from the 
identity of its original God positing, but not as the natural religion of Enlightenment times might 
picture it, in independence from a rational world-architect and serenely possessing as its own its 
limited faculties of reason, imagination, and will.  That human consciousness is God-positing 
and at the same time self-separated from the divine is the core of Tillich’s view of human reality 
(ibid., 125-27).  There is a struggle at the core of the religious relationship, which in its most 
explicit form is the guilt-accepting acceptance of unacceptability, viewed in The Courage to Be 
as Martin Luther’s personal or existential experience of Christian grace.  In that experience, God 
is comprehends as the ontological Yes that includes its No, and blessedness is experienced as 
both bliss and the nameless anxiety it conquers (CB 170-71, 180). 
 
Tillich’s 1912 theological dissertation, Mysticism and Guilt-consciousness in Schelling’s  
Philosophical Development, identifies the core of all of Schelling’s thought in the tension 
between the identity of God and the finite and the ‘fall’ (self-separation) of the later—or the 
otherness of existence, signified by the failure of the ontological proof (MG 35).  While one 
might want to calculate the period of Schelling’s philosophical development in terms of the 
influence of other philosophers, so that besides the philosophy of nature there are periods where 
Plato, Spinoza, Boehme, Baader, Hegel, and finally Aristotle provide inspiration, there is really 
only one thematic thread at work throughout: the identity principle and its relation to moral 
categories such as separation, fall, and freedom.  Tillich prefers the clarity of the 1809 
Philosophical Investigations to the detail of the positive philosophy (ibid. 22-25).  The 
discussion of Schelling’s text that he offers is quite condensed and cryptic. The early Fichtean 
works, the essays in Naturphilosophie and the aesthetics of genius that crown the System of 
Transcendental Idealism are all read as variants of identity theory: ethical mysticism, nature 
mysticism, aesthetic mysticism (ibid., 45-68).  Philosophy and Religion marks a turn toward 
history, and with the teaching of the self-separation or fall of the ideas into finite existence the 
mysticism of intellectual intuition is put at risk.  Tillich’s exegesis of the freedom essay is quite 
dense and free-form: contradiction and self-will are read as ‘sin’ and ‘guilt’, and the cosmic 
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process of separation of good and evil read as triumph of ‘grace’ over ‘death and wrath’ (ibid., 
108-112).  But in phrases such as “the identity of sin and grace” Tillich thinks in solidarity with 
Schelling that evil and the self-will that is its origin remains even in the cosmic resolution.  Guilt 
has its ground in ontology, as Tillich major works assert, and is no more a psychological quirk 
than the background radiation of anxiety that its horizon and cradle. 
 
II. 
Tillich’s theology follows Schelling’s philosophy in its insistence that religious questions are 
ontological ones,  that ontology is a dynamic domain—and not an overview of an assemblage of 
things manufactured or arbitrarily brought together.  The logos of being follows from the 
question, first posed by Leibniz, Why is there is something and not nothing?  In its first and 
highest instance, being is self-realizing, that it includes and comprehends the possibility of 
nonbeing: that it stands out from nonbeing. 
 
Tillich opens Systematic Theology with an essay on reason and revelation.  In its asking of the 
first and ultimate questions, reason is driven beyond itself to ‘mystery’, the ground and abyss 
that precedes reason. It is of ultimate concern for us because it is about the ground of our being, 
and it is ‘ecstatic’ because it reaches beyond the subject-object structure for that which is primal.  
And it involves, says Tillich, “ontological” or metaphysical shock in that it involves: Why not 
nothing? and with that the realization that I or anybody might not be here to ask the question (ST 
1, 110-113).   There is something disquieting about the answers such a question can receive, for 
they are irretrievably symbolic or metaphorical; if one says “the divine life is a dynamic unity of 
depth and form,” and goes on to explain that  by ”depth” one means the abysmal character of 
God, the ineffability and inexhaustibility of being itself, by ‘form” one means  word, logic or 
structure, and by “dynamic unity” a process of unforeseeable  communication or unfolding, it is 
obvious that these are not logical or personal categories (ST 1, 156, cp. 115).  Tillich takes both 
this ontological starting point and the terms for describing the three-dimensional life of God from 
Schelling 
 
First, let us look to the theme of Schelling’s concept of ontology.  When Schelling publically 
inaugurated the Positive Philosophy in 1841/42 with the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Revelation, insisting that the difference between concept and existence (or possibility and 
actuality) was unbridgeable, that the finite being of the potencies followed from the 
unforeseeable existence of the absolute Prius, he deepened and refined two earlier veins of 
ontological exploration (PO 160-64).  The first to be explored (in the writings of 1795-1801) was 
the relatively simple concept of God or the absolute as self-existent.  The second (explored in the 
writings of 1801-1815) was the concept of God or the absolute as free over against being, or 
having an actuality that somehow dialectically combined being and nonbeing, or envisioned 
existence as involving a power that asserted being over nonbeing.  The first line of thought yields 
a pure essence, the concept of necessary existence whose ontological status is necessary but 
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contingent—a necessary existent, if it exists.  The actus purus of the second line of thought 
makes the divine being contingently necessary, relative to the possibility for other-being that it 
established (ibid., 165-171).  In a third aspect, the positive philosophy stipulates that God is spirit 
or freedom over against primordial being and realized possibility, the evolution of that which 
ought to be (ibid., 172-76).  The complicated line of thought developed here fundamentally pits 
the concept of necessary existence against freedom to be or not to be.   
 
Schelling had always demonstrated a fondness for the ontological proof, though he was as 
skeptical as Kant about whether it ‘worked’.  In 1795, he argued that in the realm of proof, we 
are always dealing with conditions; the divine being, however, ought to be a matter of rational 
analysis. And when we ascribe being to the absolute, we ought not confuse being with contingent 
existence or actuality (SW I, 308, 308n). In 1802, Schelling uses the analog of the ontological 
proof to explain the certainty of intellectual intuition; from the very idea of an absolute cognition 
that one has, one can infer the reality of an absolute wherein form and being are the same. What 
is deficient in the so-called proof is its picturing its object as somehow subsisting outside of its 
cognizing and being-cognized (SW 4, 363-68).  In 1804 Schelling repeats and amplifies this 
argument, moving from the self-intuition of reason in intellectual intuition to the conclusion that 
what is realized in reason is the idea of God.  The idea of God is self-realizing in reason—the 
form of cognition that is self-identical and beyond the difference of discursive knowing (SW 6, 
150-54).  The idea of God, which is self-enjoyed in intellectual intuition, illuminates the ‘why’ of 
God’s being, i.e., it is modally necessary, not factual, and so forever beyond the reach of 
nonbeing.  Nothing or utter nonbeing is impossible.  Says Schelling: 
The absolute light: the idea of God, strikes reason like a flash of lightning, so to speak, 
and its luminosity endures in reason as an eternal affirmation of knowledge.  By virtue of 
this affirmation, which is the essence of our soul, we recognize the eternal impossibility 
of nonbeing that can never be known or comprehended; and that ultimate question posed 
by the vertiginous intellect hovering at the abyss of the infinite: ‘Why is there something 
rather than nothing?, this question will be swept aside forever by the necessity of being, 
that is, by the absolute affirmation of being in knowledge (ibid., 155). 
 
For Tillich’s purposes, though not ultimately for Schelling, this dynamic being that incorporates 
and excludes nonbeing suffices to get the project of systematic theology underway.  God is the 
affirmation of being, and if being is, as Spinoza realized, as power or the self-expression of what 
is essential, the human finds her essential being expressed in the religious relationship.  Another 
way to say this is to say that because the divine-human relationship is at the core of the human 
being, her fundamental problem (finitude) and her awareness of it (anxiety) all pertain to that 
relationship to too (CB 24-28).  If modern man experiences life as precarious and his self-
awareness is anxiety, anxiety is a religious experience. 
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Tillich chooses to follow Schelling in calling the primordial or ontological aspect of God “the 
Abyss.”  It is the ground of reality, human and natural; it is ineffable or inconceivable, self-
enclosed and manifests itself only as power of resisting nonbeing.  The only thing literal or 
nonsymbolic that one can say of God is that it is being itself, neither a being nor the totality of 
being.   Various theologies have tried to apply categories of relation to the God-human 
relationship, but it is symbolic or non-literal speech if we speak of God as the creator or 
immanent cause, or find that things inhere in God (ST1, 236-38).  All ontological speech is 
symbolic or analogous—except to say that something is and cannot not be. Ever careful with his 
words, Tillich notes that “it is as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as to deny it.  God is 
being itself, not a being” (ibid., 237).  About symbolic speech, he thinks a symbol speaks ‘truly’ 
if it reveals something or speaks to somebody.  But the history of religions is filled with dead 
symbols, or ways of speaking of the finite-infinite relation that fail to reflect light in both 
directions. 
 
Tillich adopts a mode of trinitarian thinking from Schelling that is ontological, prior to any 
discussion of Christian doctrine of the Trinity.  Human intuition has always distinguished the 
element of power in the divine from the element of meaning, the logos or word, and then gone on 
to distinguish a third principle of communication or expression whereby the finite and the 
infinite are united, spirit (ST 1, 250-251).  Schelling displays this trinitarian way of thinking as 
early as the Bruno, where the three potencies of identity theory are rescued from the dry 
Spinozism of Presentation of My System and put into Neoplatonic and mythic guise, wherein the 
finite individuals in their apostasy from their organic life in the Ideas are seem to be products of 
self-will or self-temporization (SW 4: 283-84).  The identity of all or the eternal potency is 
compared to the Father, the infinite or ideal potencies to the Spirit which unifies, while the finite 
is by its own will made subject to time and suffering (ibid., 252).  Trinitarian thinking is found in 
the Philosophical Investigations as well, with one of the triadic structures (nature, man, and a 
personal God) used to secure the philosophical account of the possibility of evil (PI 62-63)  and 
another (Ungrund, nature and spirit) used to explain the dynamics of development (ibid., 69-70). 
 
 
 
III. 
Let us turn to a closer look at Tillich’s theology.  Generally we will look to the text of Systematic 
Theology for discussions of theological and philosophical method. The contemporary look back 
at the interface of religious and other cultural institutions cannot help but be historical---and 
critical.  For insight into Tillich’s thought about the current state of Christian theology and the 
possibility of its relevance to the human situation in the age of anxiety, when much of Christian 
writings, rites and morality are seen to be worn out and lacking in the power to guide, we look to 
the more homiletic Courage to Be lectures. 
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Systematic theology operates by what Tillich calls the “the method of correlation.”  Questions 
that are philosophical, or really anthropological, receive theological answers, for religion 
functions as one of the chief repositories of answers about existence that the question-posing 
animal requires.  “Man is the question he asks about himself, before any question has been 
formulated” (ST I, 62).  The method of correlation explains the content of the Christian faith 
through the interdependence of existential questions and theological answers (ibid., 60-61}.   
A coherentist epistemology is at work here. No inherently true human experiences, miraculous 
sightings or inerrant writings can be found to validate or invalidate a religious worldview—
something that is essentially philosophical (or undecidable)!  “Revelation does not destroy 
reason, but reason raises the question of revelation” (ibid., 81).   
 
The Schelling of the 1809 Philosophical Investigations shares with both his major 20th century 
disciples, Heidegger and Tillich, the conviction that questions about God and world occur in 
humankind because man is the site of both questioning and self-awareness. Whether or not such 
questions are answerable, or resolvable through analysis or action, questioning is the human 
activity par excellence. Tillich remains optimistic about the availability of answers: “Man is able 
to answer the ontological question himself because he experiences directly and immediate the 
structure of being and its elements” (ST I, 169).   As embodied finite reason, the human 
experiences being as limited power, existence as self-contradictory, and the life process itself as 
ambiguous (ibid., 81).  But as subject or self-aware, the human directly experiences being, 
existence and life and so has a pre-reflective  experience of those dimensions of the divine that  
Christian revelation speaks of as the ground of being, the possibility of new existence, and the 
life of Spirit. When the abysmal ground manifests the logos, existence is seen to be not 
essentially guilt but ‘new being’, and the social and historical dimension of life, with all of its 
promise and frailty, is seen to bear the seeds of ‘unambiguous life’ (See ST II, 176-77; III, 401-
402, 420-422). 
 
In its first appearance, says Tillich, the ontological question considers the one who poses the 
question: self and world are presumed, tied together in subject-object structure.  Secondly, the 
question concern the “elements” that make up the structure of being, thirdly the difference 
between essential being and existence, and fourth, the categories of being and knowing (ST I, 
164).  It is the second category that offers the richest field for comment, the vaguely named 
ontological elements, which come in three pairs: 
Individuality – Universality 
Dynamics – Form 
Freedom – Destiny 
 
All three concern human agency and its environment.  The first pair considers the individual or 
person as the unit of human reality.  Though singular in number, by possessing mind, the 
singular human is connected to others physically and temporally remote.  ‘Communion’ or 
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community is participation in one or more similarly individuated and self-centered selves, and is 
essential to the life of the individual (ibid., 176).  Quantification across this dimension yields an 
important measure of how persons experience themselves and their world, individualism vis-à-
vis collectivism.  Courage to Be uses this measure to distinguish not only political styles of 
existence, e.g., liberalism vis-à-vis totalitarianism, but to contrast styles of Christian conscience, 
e.g., Protestant individualism and Catholic or medieval quasi-collectivism (CB 101-117). Tillich 
avoids the stereotypical contrast between Protestantism’s freedom of conscience and Catholic 
authoritarianism, for factors other than religion and individual choice lessen the contrast between 
individualism and collectivism.  Participating in economic production, for example, enforces a 
quotidian conformism in ‘free’ societies which makes daily life similar to that in centrally 
planned economies.  The second pair is somewhat oddly named, for ‘dynamics’ indicates that 
which is unformed, but endowed with potential, or something relatively irrational in contrast to 
precise rationality.   The tension between dynamics and form indicates a creative way of 
simultaneously conserving and transcending oneself, or of preserving oneself while transforming 
self and environing conditions—like the equilibrium of a physical system or the homeostasis of 
an organism (ST I, 174-76).  Finally, the tension between freedom and destiny indicate the nature 
of a situated act by a free agent, one that necessarily takes place in a physical context and in a 
definite matrix of possibilities. “Freedom is experienced as deliberation, decision, and 
responsibility” (ibid., 184). That my act is situated means that destiny informs my freedom; that I 
have to weigh values and choose among competing alternatives means that my freedom 
participates in shaping my destiny. 
 
These three vaguely named structures of being together state the parameters of human existence 
that an individual person enacts—social, biological and mental conditions of finite human 
freedom.  While they give Tillich the tools for much of the critical or destructive work of 
Systematic Theology-- which is an encyclopedic review of the major epistemological, scientific, 
philosophical, political, psychological, social and religious ideas of our civilization-- they also 
give him the categories for positively elaborating the Christian ethic that is found in the Courage 
to Be lectures.   
 
The ontological situation for the post-modern human is continuous anxiety, accompanied by a 
pervasive guilt.  Anxiety is object-less fear, fear that persists when fear is the only thing to fear.  
Guilt is the appropriate response.  In earlier times, Western man required pictures and stories of 
places of punishment and torture by fantastic beasts and malevolent beings.  Now the most 
ordinary human beings in the most secure places imagine themselves objects of surveillance; 
everyman is Kafka’s Joseph K.—or Edward Snowden.  The human response is courage, 
ontological rather than soldierly courage, and the various styles of human existence—
individualism, conformism, and collectivism—determine corresponding styles of courage to be.   
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Anxiety is an ontological malady, the awareness of our own finitude or of the fact that we carry 
nonbeing in our very ontic self-expression. There is anxiety in every fear, and vice versa.  The 
fear of death lurks behind the fear in every anxiety, but close inspection reveals that the human is 
anxious about being itself.  “The basic anxiety, the anxiety of a finite being about the threat of 
nonbeing, cannot be eliminated. It belongs to being itself” (CB 39). Tillich elaborates three styles 
or potencies of anxiety: 1) the anxiety of unpredictability (fate) and death, 2) the anxiety of 
emptiness and meaninglessness, and 3) and the anxiety of despair.  Uncertainty and lack of 
control prefigure death, the poverty of the outcome of one’s work portends meaninglessness, but 
the upshot of all our acts, from their moral foundations to their spiritual satisfaction, seems to 
crumble into dust and leave only a vague residue of guilt.  Everything in human life points to 
despair, except for the multitude of petty distractions and evasions which for the most part keep 
us comfortably numb (ibid., 40-56). 
 
In response to this map of the labyrinth of despair, Tillich offers a slim thread twisted from the 
various of courageous response.  The basic alternatives are to rely upon oneself or to take refuge 
in the collective: self-reliance undergirds the romantic, naturalistic, and demonic forms of 
individualism seen in recent cultural history, and paves the way for the lonely encounter of the 
resolute person in absolute anxiety (ibid., 148-49). The other, collectivistic, alternative chooses 
the path of participation and becomes mysticism.  The mystic is willing to turn ontology inside 
out and so finds rest in that doubt is turned against finite being and negates it, since everything 
that appears is deceptive and illusory.  “Nonbeing is no threat because finite being is, in the last 
analysis, nonbeing. . . .  The anxiety of meaninglessness is conquered where the ultimate 
meaning is not something definite but the abyss of every definite meaning” (ibid., 158-59). 
Tillich has limited confidence in the mystic solution, although every individualistic kind of 
ontological courage involves an element of trusting in the abyss, or the power of being to 
overcome nonbeing. 
 
Since religion gives answers to questions that philosophy poses, it must be the elemental 
character of the human situation in which the definitive answer to anxiety can be found.  So 
Tillich looks again to the individual-or-participant structure of the person’s selfhood and finds 
that in the middle between mystic absorption into the ground and personal encounter with a so-
called ‘divine person’ one finds faith (CB 156-57).  Absolute faith—perhaps naked faith might 
be the better term—does not deny or transcend meaninglessness as mysticism does, but embraces 
it, at least within a skeptical moment of its action.  The skeptical element cuts against the 
subject-object structure of personal encounter, so that, it seems that the modern existentialist 
hero encounters nothing but meaninglessness in its purest or grittiest form (ibid., 177-78).  It 
almost goes without saying that the skeptical element, so exercised, will also sweep away almost 
all the forms, formulas, and rituals of prior versions of Christianity.  Though Tillich speaks more 
reticently (or professionally) in Systematic Theology, there is little asserted in its third volume 
about the Spirit, the community and the ‘kingdom of God’ in history that is edifying or 
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consoling.  The presence of the Spirit in a spiritual community that may or may not have much to 
do with the churches and their muddled histories is everywhere ambiguous, even if Spirit is 
defined as ‘unambiguous life’ (ST 3, 183 ff).  As representing the kingdom of God and 
embodying the spiritual community, the churches both reveal and hide (ibid., 375).  
 
Absolute faith is empty faith, or to say the same thing, ontological faith—trusting in the power of 
being--which always has to be glossed as the expansion or assertion of being over the contraction 
of nonbeing.  Nonbeing is the element in being which forces, which by enclosing its power 
within limits, forces it to be beyond itself and to open itself as power and love.  Speaking in 
almost as oracular as fashion as Schelling does in the Philosophical Investigations, Tillich states: 
Nonbeing (that in God which makes his self-affirmation dynamic) opens up the divine 
self-seclusion and reveals him as power and love. Nonbeing makes God a living God. 
Without the No he has to overcome in himself and in his creatures, the divine Yes to 
himself would be lifeless.  There would be no revelation of the ground of being, there 
would be no life (CB 180).   
 
What of the ‘believer’ (or absolute skeptic, rather) in the situation of absolute faith?  The horizon 
of meaningless is not expunged, guilt is not assuaged, and there is no Kantian court of reason to 
indict or to acquit. One finds, like the anguished Luther, that one is accepted trotz one’s 
unacceptability. At the boundary between being and nonbeing, and far beyond all forms of 
theism which ever and again forget the ontological difference and that figure the divine as a 
being, absolute faith fears no judgment and asks no forgiveness (ibid., 189-90).  This is the 
paradox of Christianity, says Tillich: not irrational, not absurd, and nor reflectively or 
dialectically rational. The ‘paradox’ is a new reality and not a logical riddle (ST II, 91). 
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